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Names and individuals1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
What do proper names refer to? Do proper names have meaning?  
These questions have revealed to be particularly elusive for philosophers and linguists 
working on the semantics of names,2 but at least when it comes to the first question two 
broader theoretical currents have emerged and given rise to a robust literature, namely 
referentialism—the view that names are singular terms—, and predicativism—the view that 
names are predicates. I shall not, however, go into the specific discussion of which of those 
views provides the most adequate semantic analysis of proper names. The present paper is a 
referentialist paper, in the sense that first, only referentialist theories will be presented and 
dealt with, and second, a referentialist theory will be proposed as an alternative to the existing 
ones.3 
This paper proceeds as follows. The main goal of section 2 is to assess the two major 
referentialist theories, descriptivism and the direct-reference or causal theory, in some of their 
most popular forms. Section 3 presents and develops an alternative approach, which I call the 
cluster-occurrence theory (‘occurrence theory’ for short). This theory draws on contemporary 
metaphysical ideas about the notions of individual and identity over time, and it aims at 
developing two suggestions advanced by Searle, namely that our understanding of the nature 
of an object involves two different cognitive operations; and that names are associated with 
                                                
1 I am especially indebted to John Searle for fruitful discussions on the topics of this paper. I also thank the 
audience of Philang2015 (Lodz, Poland), in particular Martin Vacek, Heimir Geirsson, Mirela Fuš and Wolfram 
Hinzen for their stimulating questions and valuable comments. This work is supported by FAPESP grant n. 
2014054826. 
2 I shall use the term ‘name’ as a short for ‘proper name’, unless otherwise specified. 
3 For predicativist theories, see Burge 1973 and Fara 2015. 
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Intentional contents. Finally, section 4 confronts some crucial aspects of descriptivism, the 
causal theory, and occurrence theory, and section 5 concludes and indicates some future lines 
of investigation in connection with occurrence theory. 
 
 
2. Referentialist theories 
 
The two dominant referentialist views on the semantics of proper names are descriptivism and 
the direct-reference or causal theory. The present section aims at presenting and assessing 
these theories, as well as identifying their respective weaknesses in providing a fully 
satisfactory account of the way in which names refer to individuals. 
 
 
2.1. Descriptivism 
 
Descriptivism goes back at least to Frege (1892) and Russell (1905) and is the view (aside 
from some specificities related to different versions) that a name is a kind of ‘disguised’ 
definite description. In other terms, names refer indirectly via their associated definite 
descriptions. For example, the name ‘Paris’ would refer to the city of Paris by virtue of its 
being associated with, say, the definite description ‘the capital of France’. This idea was then 
refined by a theory called cluster-descriptivism often attributed to Searle (1958) and Strawson 
(1959)—but see below for Searle’s reaction. Cluster-descriptivism proposes as the sense of a 
name an unrestricted number of definite descriptions (instead of a single one), some of which 
at least should be true of the referent of the name for it to refer to its referent. The name 
‘Paris’ would then be associated with a list including, in addition to ‘the capital of France’, 
certain other definite descriptions such as ‘the hometown of Mallarmé’, ‘the venue of EXPO 
1900’, and so forth. Searle’s version is taken as identifying those disguised descriptions with 
the Fregean sense (Sinn) of proper names, whereas Russell (who rejected the sense/reference 
dichotomy) sees them as the real logical analysis of proper names—to Russell, therefore, 
descriptions operate on names at the level of logical forms, not at the semantic level of the 
analysis as in the cases of Frege and Searle.  
As a matter of fact, descriptivism as it is typically understood cannot be unquestionably 
attributed to Frege, who offered in some respects but a vague conception of Sinn. It is the neo-
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Fregean development of the notion of sense as intension (mainly through the works of Carnap 
1947 and Church 1951) that is usually coped with the descriptivist thesis on proper names. 
Intension is defined as a function from possible worlds to extensions; that is to say, the 
intension of a proper name determines the extension of the name with respect to a given 
possible world. For instance, the intension of the name ‘Hesperus’—which is identified with 
some (cluster of) description(s)—fixes the extension of the name in the actual world as being 
the planet Venus, but in some other possible world it could be some other object, say Halley’s 
Comet. This would constitute the intensionalistic version of Frege’s solution to his famous 
puzzle (cf. Frege 1892): what distinguishes the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ 
semantically is not their extensions (with respect to the actual world), which are both Venus, 
but rather their intensions, which in fact return different extensions in some (non-actualized) 
possible world. We will have more to say on intension later on. 
Briefly stated, descriptivism is then the view that names have intension in conjunction 
with extension (referent), and that those intensions are spelt out as definite descriptions. 
In addition, descriptivists typically endorse more or less explicitly the idea that the 
description(s) associated with names may vary across different contexts. For example, 
historians tell that the city of Paris was already named ‘Paris’ when it became the capital of 
France. Thus before being the capital of France, the name ‘Paris’ could not have been 
correctly associated with the description ‘the capital of France’, whereas in our present 
context it can be so described, and in some future context it could well be the case that it 
cannot anymore. This type of context-sensitive descriptivism is confronted, however, to an 
immediate difficulty related to one of its most appealing features—that of trying to explain 
how names can have sense (as intension) and not only reference. Does the intension of a name 
vary across different contexts? If so, how do speakers come to assimilate such changes and go 
on applying the name correctly? In particular, if intension is meant to capture Frege’s 
conception of Sinn as an objective notion, an explanation is required as to how objectivity is 
attained under context-sensitivity. 
Descriptivism was famously attacked by Kripke (1980), who advanced a number of 
seemingly devastating arguments designed to show that no possible version of descriptivism 
could eventually qualify as an adequate semantic theory of proper names. Just to mention the 
most cited of those arguments, also known as the modal argument, names cannot possibly 
reduce to (any type of) descriptions because for any name N and any (cluster of) 
description(s) D, it can easily be shown that N and D have different ‘modal profiles’. What 
this means is that even though N and D may refer to the same individual in the possible world 
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at issue, there still exists some other possible world in which they refer to different 
individuals. Thus for instance, if we consider a cluster D of descriptions associated with the 
name ‘Paris’, there is a possible world (as a matter of fact, infinitely many of them) in which 
the city of Paris fails to be the referent of any description in D—in that possible world, Paris 
is neither the capital of France (it could be the capital of Portugal), nor the hometown of 
Mallarmé (who could have been born in Bordeaux), nor the venue of EXPO 1900 (which 
could have been held in Madrid), and so forth indefinitely. 
If accepted, the conclusion that no possible version of descriptivism can be correct 
seems to send us back to the basic question about the semantics of names: How is it possible 
to refer to an individual by its name? What feature of the name ‘Paris’ makes it possible for 
that name to refer to the city of Paris?  
 
 
2.2. The causal (or direct-reference) theory 
 
The causal theory is the modern version of an old idea, whose source is often traced in the 
literature to the work of Mill (1843)—another important reference being Marcus (1961).4 This 
is the reason why the causal theory is frequently thought of as a revival and development of 
the view on proper names called Millianism, according to which proper names refer directly 
to individuals, with no intervening mechanism between names and their referents. This seems 
to commit oneself to the claim that names have no meaning, only reference, but causal 
theorists do not often address the ‘problem of meaning’ (i.e., of whether proper names have 
meaning and if so, what their meaning consists in).  In that connection, Kripke goes as far as 
to emphasize that he does not take his own ideas as constituting any theory whatsoever—thus 
he would probably not call them ‘the causal theory’ as we are doing here (if only for 
terminological purposes)—but merely a “picture” of how names refer. 
Millianism came to the front stage before descriptivism, and this seems to reflect a 
strong intuition to the effect that a name does appear to be a kind of meaningless ‘tag’ that is 
attached to some object to which the name is then used to refer directly, with no mediating 
conceptual mechanism involved in that referring process. There is no concept behind the 
name ‘Paris’, which simply refers directly to the city of Paris—this idea is suggested by the 
term direct-reference theory, which is also used as a more or less alternative label to ‘causal 
                                                
4 We already find related ideas as early as in Plato’s Cratylus—although that Platonic dialogue focuses on the 
conventionality of words in general.  
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theory’. Moreover, there are in general no lexical entries for names in dictionaries—when 
there are, they are encyclopedic rather than lexical entries, as in the cases of certain famous 
people, rivers, cities etc. 
Interestingly, the revival of Millianism operated by the likes of Kripke (1980, originally 
1972) and Donnellan (1972) may be seen as an extension of Russell’s (1905, 1911) ideas on 
what he called ‘logically proper names’. To Russell, logically proper names are associated 
with no concept, and their referents are presented to the speakers directly by acquaintance. 
One canonical example of a logical proper name is a demonstrative such as ‘that’, which 
picks out its referent in some context by directly presenting it, typically by ostension. Russell 
required that the speakers of the language be acquainted with the referent of ‘that’ in order for 
them to adequately use and understand the word, and the way in which speakers normally 
become acquainted with the referent of ‘that’ is through the sense data somehow connecting 
the object to the speakers (e.g. by visual stimuli). According to Russell, however, proper 
names in our sense, which he called ‘ordinary proper names’, cannot be classified as logically 
proper names, for the simple reason that we are able to adequately use and understand them 
without having to be acquainted with their referents. Thus for example, we are able to talk 
about Greek philosophers and yet there is no acquaintance via sense data involved in our 
understanding of utterances containing names of Greek philosophers. Therefore, ordinary 
proper names must be analyzed out in terms of other expressions in such a way that we may 
become (indirectly) acquainted with the referent of the name via the new expression. This 
new expression, as we know, is a definite description. 
Now the revival of Russell’s theory consists in doing away with his epistemology of 
sense data. It is then possible to directly refer to some object without being acquainted via 
sense data with that object. This would have the effect of enlarging the category of logically 
proper names so as to encompass ordinary proper names. Sense data are only one of the 
available media through which acquaintance is gained, while ordinary proper names are 
related to some other way of directly referring to objects in the world. An immediate question, 
and one to which we shall return later on, is how then speakers become acquainted (in this 
new non-Russellian sense) with the referents of ordinary proper names? 
 
 
2.3. Internalism and externalism 
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A useful way of clarifying the dispute between descriptivism and the causal theory is in terms 
of the debate confronting semantic internalism and externalism. Going back to Frege’s article 
(1892), the initial motivation for drawing a distinction between two levels of semantic values 
comes from what is known as Frege’s Identity Puzzle. Specifically, Frege asks what the 
cognitive difference is between the expressions “a = a” and “a = b,” where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are two 
constants, or names. We know his answer: ‘a’ and ‘b’ have the same referent, but are 
associated with different senses. The cognitive imports of names, to Frege’s view, are thus 
encoded at the level of senses, and this is taken to be a type of internalist account of the 
semantics of names, in the sense that the Sinn of a name is intrinsically linked to the cognitive 
apparatus of the speakers.5 
The causal theory, on the other hand, seems to side with the antagonist current of 
semantic externalism, according to which cognition, or speakers’ ‘internal’ capacities, is not 
sufficient to determine reference—as Putnam (1975) famously stated it, “ ‘meanings’ just 
ain’t in the head.” According to the causal theory, a name such as ‘Aristotle’ refers to 
Aristotle regardless of any qualitative description that might be associated, individually or 
collectively, with the name ‘Aristotle’. Once the name is effectively ascribed to an individual 
through some kind of dubbing ceremony, or initial baptism,6 facts about the external world 
are required to guarantee that an utterance of the name refers to its correct referent. In other 
words, regardless of which concepts any speaker may attribute to ‘Aristotle’, this name refers 
to the individual initially dubbed ‘Aristotle’. I might just repeat some very general statement I 
heard about Aristotle, say, “Aristotle is great” without having any information at all about the 
individual Aristotle—suppose I am a high school student who hears the sentence from a 
teacher I very much admire, and then repeat it to my little brother at home—, yet the facts of 
the matter about the external world (e.g., the dubbing ceremony related to the name, the fact 
that some individual is identical to the individual named ‘Aristotle’ etc.) guarantee that the 
name will refer to the correct individual, i.e., to Aristotle. 
 
 
3. The cluster-occurrence theory of proper names 
                                                
5 This is not to be confused with senses being subjective, or dependent on particular speakers. Frege was explicit 
in emphasizing that senses are objectively shared by the community of speakers of a language—see Frege’s 
(1892) discussion about the distinction between the objectivity of sense and the subjectivity of a mere image. 
6 Obviously, neither ‘ceremony’ nor ‘baptism’ should be taken literally here, the important point being that the 
way in which a name is attributed to an individual is always via some sort of dubbing event by some 
communally accepted authority (e.g. the parents of a child, the owner of a pet etc.). 
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Having set the semantic background, I wish to introduce next a new kind of referentialist 
approach to proper names, which I will call the cluster-occurrence theory, or occurrence 
theory for short. As the label indicates, the view to be proposed in the following lines has 
some features in common with cluster-descriptivism. In particular, the occurrence theory is an 
internalist theory that attaches to names some Fregean sense of sorts, based on the notion of a 
(time-indexed) cluster of individual occurrences. On the other hand, it crucially departs from 
descriptivism in a way that makes it less apart from the causal theory that one might suppose 
at first. Specifically, the way in which proper names refer will turn out not to be one of an 
intrinsically qualitative or linguistic kind. Indeed, such a kind of linguistic analysis of the 
intension of proper names was an essential component of Kripke’s attacks on descriptivism.  
In his response to Kripke, Searle (1983, ch. 9) contends that descriptivism, as he 
understands that view, is by no means committed to descriptions as linguistic forms, and he 
gives instead a more neutral account of the sense of proper names on the basis of what he 
calls Intentional (with a ‘t’) content. I am not entirely convinced that descriptivism is not in 
general associated with linguistic forms, given its systematic (and I would even dare to say, 
exclusive) recourse to definite descriptions, but I shall not engage in such a debate here.7 In 
any event, the important point about Searle’s response is that it does offer a more general 
internalist theory of names, be this a brand-new theory or just a clarification of implicit, 
inaccurate or unappreciated elements already stated by some standard versions of 
descriptivism. In Searle’s construal of descriptivism, “what counts is not the fact that 
[descriptivists] give a verbal description, but that there is an Intentional content [associated 
with utterances of proper names]” (1983, p. 241; Searle’s emphasis). The following may be 
seen as an attempt to expand on this idea of an Intentional content. 
 Rather than directly tackling the issue of how utterances of names succeed to refer to 
individuals, I shall begin by addressing the question of what an individual is in the first place. 
This means that we shall first work through an ontological and metaphysical stage, before 
proceeding to the further semantic step of explaining what the intension of a name is, and 
what kind of entity names refer to via their intension. As we will see next, that preliminary 
                                                
7 It does seem to me that the claim that Searle indeed never supported cluster-descriptivism is a fairly defensible 
and even plausible one, but we can avoid the debate by assuming for the sake of exposition that descriptivism is 
the view originated from Frege–Russell’s ideas, and that cluster-descriptivism is then a reasonable development 
of descriptivism. I shall thus refer to Searle’s own account by the term Searle’s late descriptivism. In fact as we 
shall see, the views that I will advocate in the present paper may be largely seen as a development of Searle’s 
late descriptivism. 
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ontological step may also be viewed as a development of another idea recurrently emphasized 
by Searle. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Individuation, identification and the causal theory 
 
The basic ontological assumption in occurrence theory is that our inventory of objects, or in 
the logician’s jargon our domain of quantification (or in still other terms, the universe of our 
model) is constituted by individual occurrences, not by individuals simpliciter as is 
presupposed by the standard analyses (i.e., possible-world semantics and derived systems). 
 As Searle remarked (1983, p. 259), 
 
What counts as an object and hence as a possible target for naming and referring is always 
determined relative to a system of representation. Given that we have a system rich enough to 
individuate objects (e.g., rich enough to count one horse, a second horse, a third horse…), and to 
identify and reidentify objects (e.g., rich enough to determine what must be the case if that is to be 
the same horse as the one we saw yesterday), we can then attach names to objects in such a way as 
to preserve the attachment of the same names to the same objects, even in counterfactual situations 
where the Intentional content associated with the name is no longer satisfied by the object. 
 
There are two important points about this passage. First, Searle identifies two fundamental 
operations in the constitution of our notion of an individual. The standard possible-world 
semantics used by Kripke to support his ideas about identity and rigidity actually ignores (or 
just takes for granted) the second operation, i.e., the identification operation determining the 
sameness of two individuals previously singled out by the first operation of individuation.  
In the specific case that interests us here, in connection with the causal theory, names 
are ascribed to previously individuated individuals (i.e., individuals that were singled out as 
such by the operation of individuation), and then the way in which the name is used post-
baptism is settled by the causal chain (which is a chain that somehow links each further 
utterance of the name to that original one going back to the dubbing ceremony). We can see, 
therefore, that only individuation has some (implicit) role to play in the semantics of names, 
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via initial baptism—naming implying previous individuation. Sameness plays no role at all in 
the semantics of names: individuation is simply ignored by the standard model. 
Contrastingly, a number of metaphysicians have been insisting on the importance of 
identification in the constitution of our notion of individual. Indeed, one of the central 
questions of contemporary metaphysics is how individuals persist through time. As it 
happens, this is an issue of identification, for the problem of identity over time may be stated 
as a problem of identification: given some individual i at time t, how do we identify i at t+1? 
what makes i the same individual at t and t+1? 
Without both operations, it seems, we cannot in general8 adequately account for the 
concept of an individual, at least as this concept is normally processed by human cognition. 
This is obvious in the case of individuation, for without this operation the notion an individual 
cannot even arise in the first place. But this is also true of identification; for without this 
operation we would not be able to see individuals as we actually do in general, that is, as 
temporally stable entities. With only individuation, we would see each individual as persisting 
for only a restricted period (or unit) of time; each time unit would entirely renovate the 
inventory of objects of the whole universe. There would be no room for the concept of the 
self to arise either, for I could not think of myself now as the same individual as myself five 
minutes, five seconds ago. Such a picture seems to describe an extremely rudimentary form of 
cognition, and at the very least not a human-like one. 
Now the important point is that the notion of individual is absolutely crucial to the 
semantics of names. So stated this seems obvious, even trivial, since every semantic theory of 
proper names (in any case, every referentialist theory of proper names) takes it as a primary 
assumption. However, I am not merely affirming that any notion of individual is central to the 
semantics of names, but rather that the specific notion of individual as construed by human 
cognition is central to the semantics of names. This is the obvious, though not so trivial point 
that I shall attempt to argue for. It is not trivial because the causal theory, in disregarding the 
operation of identification, is an example of a theory that does not work with the required 
notion of individual.  
 
 
3.2. Identification, externalism and the causal chain 
                                                
8 In the case of abstract entities such as numbers, which are typically immune to change, the issue of 
identification does not apply. But this is the ‘easy’ case, in which the intension of a name of an abstract object is 
its definition—e.g. the intension of the numeral ‘1’ is the same as the intension of the definite description ‘the 
successor of 0’, which may serve as a definition of the natural number 1. 
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Since the causal theory is not equipped with a temporal notion of individual, time must crop 
up somewhere else, because for one thing, the most basic question that referentialist theories 
attempt to answer is perhaps how a name is able to refer to the individual it names even when 
its utterance is distant in space and time from that individual—the recognition of the 
fundamental role of time in the semantics of names is thus to a large extent an inescapable 
condition for any intelligible (referentialist) theory.  
Indeed, the idea of a causal chain of communication is designed by the causal theorist to 
account for how names are passed from speaker to speaker through time (and space). To state 
it briefly and crudely, the causal theory comprises two essential components, namely initial 
baptism and the causal chain. Initial baptism accounts for individuation, while the causal 
chain accounts for identification. 
There is a problem about the latter, though, as showed by Searle (1983, p. 244 ff.). We 
have seen that the causal theory is an externalist semantic theory, which means that successful 
reference is secured in the case of names by some external causal chain attaching an utterance 
of a name to its referent. Now if this external causal chain is what is meant by the causal chain 
of communication, then it would seem that the chain would be at least partly internal, for it 
would depend for example on the intentions of speakers to refer by that name to the same 
individual referred to by speakers earlier in the chain.9 In other words, if it is a chain of 
communication that guarantees that some name refers to some individual, then reference to 
that individual depends on a feature of the speakers’ minds. 
On the other hand, externalist descriptions of the causal chain are pervasive among 
different versions of the causal theory, and particularly explicit in Donnellan’s work, which 
mentions an “omniscient being who sees the whole history of the affair” (Donnellan 1972), or 
an “omniscient observer of history” (Donnellan 1974). Let us baptize such a being ‘God’—
only for the sake of further reference, with no pejorative connotation. The idea is that God, 
rather than the minds of the speakers, secures successful reference in the case of names.  If I 
say, “Socrates was wise,” what guarantees that I am referring to Socrates, whom I am not and 
cannot possibly be acquainted with (in Russell’s sense), is not any feature of my mind 
enabling me to associate some cognitive (or in Searle’s jargon, Intentional) content with the 
name ‘Socrates’; what secures reference to Socrates is God, who is in a much more reliable 
                                                
9 Kripke (1980: 96): “When the name is ‘passed from link to link’, the receiver of the name must, I think, intend 
when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it. If I hear the name 
‘Napoleon’ and decide it would be a nice name for my pet aardvark, I do not satisfy this condition.” 
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position than me to carry out the association of the name with the individual whom was once 
named ‘Socrates’. Thus even if I have a completely mistaken idea of Socrates, for example if 
I believe that Socrates was a French revolutionary who defeated Napoleon in Iraq, even in this 
case I would be referring to Socrates and saying about him that he was wise. 
Searle then objects that from such an externalist perspective the causal chain of 
communication has no explanatory power whatsoever. His point is clear enough: if God is 
sufficient to secure reference, why do we need any communication, any speaker intention, 
anything whatever connected to the speakers’ minds? Speakers are supposed to be mere 
vehicles for the utterances of names, while God does the job of associating those names with 
their respective referents. The communication chain and the external chain are completely 
different descriptions of the way in which names refer. In particular, the former offers an 
internalist causal explanation of how speakers learn to use a name, whereas the former simply 
lacks any explanation of successful reference, which falls under God’s responsibility alone. 
Suppose you tell me you saw Jane yesterday and I ask, “Who’s Jane?” In asking this 
question, I am already using the name ‘Jane’, I am already referring to Jane, with no hint on 
what the referent of the name actually is. The causal chain has reached up to me, yet the name 
is semantically strange to me just as before I heard it for the first time. Could we then say that 
the name ‘Jane’ was thereby successfully communicated to me? If so, computer programming 
should probably count as well as communication between the programmer and the software: 
when you design a program, you transmit to the program instructions to manipulate syntactic 
symbols, and when your computer executes the program, it is realizing a new link in that 
‘communication’ chain. Was it really communication that took place between you and your 
computer? I think not, but if one really insists in calling this kind of process ‘communication’, 
then one should at the very least make a distinction between syntactic and semantic 
communication, and then the point would be that the communication version of the causal 
chain is unable to convey semantic communication, which is arguably an essential component 
of any chain of linguistic propagation. The externalist version of the causal chain thus offers 
no explanation of successful linguistic transmission. 
Moreover, the external chain does not qualify to such a task because the figure of God 
requires no temporal dimension, nor any operation of identification—God automatically sees 
everything with absolute clearness, hence any ‘operation’ whatsoever would be simply 
redundant.  Suppose you tell about that same Jane, whom I completely ignore, that you saw 
her yesterday. Some external chain is then put in place in relation to the name ‘Jane’, and I 
eventually become able (i.e., I learn) to use the name ‘Jane’. The question is: How did that 
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external chain work? What did this chain supply that I did not have before I was able to use 
the name ‘Jane’? Surely, if I ask you who Jane is, and you say that she is your boss, I gain 
some information in terms of a definite description like ‘the boss of X’, and now I can say 
some things such as, “Jane is going to fire you if you don’t finish your report,” but that 
definite description, as the causal theorists correctly emphasize, cannot be all there is to the 
semantics of ‘Jane’. The causal chain cannot be purely described as a transmission of certain 
qualitative information. But if the chain does not work in this way, it seems that what it passes 
on from speaker to speaker is just the name ‘Jane’ itself. If the process does not involve any 
conceptual gain, it seems that I am just like a robot starting to use the name ‘Jane’. According 
to such a picture, we might begin using any name at random with the firm confidence that it 
will refer to its referent—obviously, we would say several false things about Jane, but the 
point is that we would still refer to the correct Jane. Since there is no link between our robotic 
utterance of ‘Jane’ and previous uses of the name, there is no possible account of 
identification in this purely external picture of the causal chain. 
The dilemma is that the externalist chain is unable to account for identification, whereas 
the communication chain does account for identification but is fundamentally internalist—and 
we cannot have an externalist causal chain that is at the same time internalist.  
The causal theory does not adequately account for identification, and since I have been 
claiming that no referentialist theory of proper names could be effective without accounting 
for both individuation and identification, it follows that under such a desideratum the causal 
theory is not an adequate semantic theory of proper names. 
 
 
3.3. Individual occurrences 
 
The reason why this is so may be alternatively stated as follows. Identification is already 
required at the level of baptism, and since initial baptism involves the basic ontological units 
of our referential system, the notion of individual as the basic target of reference must already 
incorporate the temporal dimension.  
To make this point clearer, suppose we have no operation of identification at all. What 
would then be the purpose of giving a name to, say, a newborn baby? We call him ‘Franz’, 
but five minutes, five seconds later we have no idea of whom or what was named ‘Franz’. 
Moreover, it is not that we just temporarily lost the capacity to reidentify; rather, this 
operation simply does not make any sense to us. Therefore, the act of naming itself would 
 13 
make no sense either. We would not be able to refer to Socrates, nor to anything we are not 
acquainted with. We already need to grasp the notion of identification at the very act of 
naming. 
As we have seen, identification is intimately related to persistence through time. The 
causal theory, on the other hand, introduced a temporal dimension only at the level of the 
causal chain. This was too late a move, however, for it missed the dubbing ceremony. The 
question is: What does it mean to say that we need to account for identification at the level of 
baptism?  
This is where I shall undertake a different strategy as compared to the standard theories, 
including Searle’s late descriptivism (i.e., the view stated in Searle 1983). I propose to resolve 
the problem of identification before proceeding to any investigation into the semantics of 
names. I thus propose an excursion into the metaphysics of persistence through time before 
coming back to the semantics of names. 
A detailed exposition of all existing theories in the literature would fall beyond the 
scope of this article, but it would be helpful if we could at least unfold before us a large-scale 
map of the contemporary debate and pinpoint on it the specific place where I wish to situate 
our discussion. 
There are two leading views on persistence through time, namely endurance and 
perdurance theories (cf. Lewis 1986, p. 202 for the introduction of the terms and discussion; 
Noonan and Curtis 2014, sec. 5, for a less sketchy overview of the theories; and Hawley 
2001, ch. 1, for a more detailed presentation). The latter claims that individuals stretch out 
over time just as over space, and that individuals have temporal as well as spatial parts—this 
is the reason why this view is also known as four-dimensionalism. The former contends that 
individuals do not spread over time, that they are instead wholly present at each single instant, 
and that what persists through time is the entire individual. In light of our previous discussion 
on the importance of time in the constitution of the concept of individual, it will come as no 
surprise that the view on individuals that I wish to expand on here is a perdurantist one. 
Perdurantism, however, also importantly splits into two main currents, namely worm 
theory and stage theory. According to the former, what persists through time is the entire 
individual made up from temporal parts, hence the analogy with a worm—but rather than 
thinking of the persisting worm as having different spatial sections, one should think of these 
sections as temporal ones. For example, the individual Barack Obama is strictly speaking not 
really the man that you saw on the TV screen on the occasion of his first speech as president 
of the United States, because what you really saw was a tiny part of the worm-Obama, that is, 
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of the whole individual Obama, who is constituted not only by that elegant gentleman on TV, 
but also by (inter alia) that little boy Barack as he pronounced his first unarticulated English 
words. 
Stage theory, on the other hand, while acknowledging the essential role of time as to the 
notion of individual, departs from worm theory in claiming that what persists through time is 
the temporal parts of an individual, not the whole individual qua worm. To put it differently, 
worm theory states a whole-part relation between continuants (i.e., persisting things) and 
temporal parts, which by themselves are not continuants. Stage theory denies this aspect of 
worm theory, and claims that those temporal parts, which are called temporal stages, are 
continuants by themselves. As such, stages are wholly present (as individuals are in 
endurantist theories) and may be (and typically are) the objects of predication and 
quantification. Thus according to stage theorists when we say that Obama is elegant, it is a 
stage of Obama that is said to be elegant, not the worm-Obama. 
To zoom in the map a little more, the notion of individual that I wish to work with in 
my account of the semantics of proper names is the one put forward by stage theorists. 
However, I shall not literally borrow the expression ‘temporal stage’ from them, but rather 
introduce the term ‘individual occurrence’ to refer to those temporal slices that perdurantists 
in general agree is an essential component of our conception of an individual. 
The reason for the introduction of a new term is that it is unclear to me whether the way 
in which I construe occurrences matches exactly the way stage theorists conceive of their 
temporal stages—though I am rather convinced that both notions may be more or less easily 
accommodated so as to match each other.10  For example, stages are standardly described as 
instantaneous entities, which means that one stage corresponds to one time instant—Sider 
(1996, 2000) only claims that stages are instantaneous without much specification about what 
is meant by an instant, whereas Hawley (2001, p. 51) favors the view of instants as points in a 
dense scale. But when we think or speak of a particular occurrence of an individual, that is, 
roughly speaking, of an appearance of an individual such as Obama, we do not have to set any 
specific duration to that occurrence. If I say that Socrates was wise, I certainly have in mind a 
particular occurrence of Socrates, not any random occurrence of Socrates (we would probably 
not attribute wisdom to Socrates as a newborn baby), but I am not necessarily speaking of any 
instantaneous occurrence of Socrates either (which strictly speaking is too fugitive for me to 
even think about). It is rather a kind of extended occurrence of Socrates (i.e., an occurrence 
                                                
10 In the same spirit, Hawley (2001, p. 50) writes that “the viability of stage theory does not depend upon the 
success of arguments about the finegrainedness of stages”—cf. the immediately following discussion. 
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over some interval of time) or perhaps more plausibly a representative occurrence of Socrates 
(i.e., some arbitrary occurrence representing all wise occurrences of Socrates, in the same 
sense that an arbitrary element of an equivalence class may be taken to represent the whole 
class11), that seems to be at issue.12 The description that one might give of the duration of an 
occurrence does not actually matter, the crucial point being that we do rely on the notion of an 
occurrence as our basic ontological entity (which point is central to stage theorists in general), 
and that whatever the duration of an occurrence might be, the important feature is that 
occurrences are the units in our referential scale. We have no reason to suppose that our 
referential scale rigidly corresponds to the scale, say, of the real numbers—at any rate, this is 
a problem for the metaphysician of time. 
Thus by working with individual occurrences, I am not advancing any significant 
metaphysical claim, but only adopting a conception as neutral as possible of stages. The 
methodological motivation for a neutral metaphysical basis is that the main points that I wish 
to advance are semantic in nature, not metaphysical. 
 
 
3.4. Individuals and the cluster-occurrence theory of proper names 
 
The semantic claims that I wish to put forward are thus the following, which together 
constitute the cluster-occurrence theory of proper names: 
 
(1) Names refer to occurrences; 
(2) Names have intension, and the intension of a name is an individual.  
 
The first claim is a fairly immediate consequence of adopting stage theory as our favorite 
approach to persistence through time, and as such it comes as no surprise that (1) has already 
been proposed by stage theorists (cf. Sider 1996; Hawley 2001). I shall thus briefly state the 
point, and then focus on the second claim, and on the relationship between individual 
occurrences and what I will call ‘individuals simpliciter’. 
                                                
11 More will be said below about equivalence classes of occurrences. 
12 I am sympathetic to Sider (1996)’s treatment of “Socrates is wise” in terms of de dicto temporal predication, 
though I tend to diverge from his account of de re temporal predication (and thus from his terminological 
dichotomy between de dicto and de re temporal predications). Such divergence will in fact manifest itself in my 
interpretations of the ‘Obama-sentences’ below, which are not carried out in terms of de re temporal 
predication—but I shall not discuss these issues in any detail here. 
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Names refer to occurrences. Given that occurrences are our basic ontological entity, and 
that according to referentialist theories names are singular terms, it naturally follows that 
names refer to occurrences. Thus for example in the sentence, “In 2009, Barack Obama 
pronounced his first words as president of the United States,” the proper name ‘Barack 
Obama’ refers to a specific occurrence of Obama temporally situated in 2009. On the other 
hand in the sentence, “In 1963, Barack Obama pronounced his first English words,” the name 
‘Barack Obama’ refers to a different occurrence of Obama, namely to an occurrence of 
Obama as a little boy.  
Let us now turn to the second claim. Occurrence (via stage) theory has to provide an 
explanation for the fact that those two different occurrences of Obama are related to each 
other in a rather special way: they are both occurrences of Obama. The way in which I shall 
put it is by saying that they are individual occurrences of the same individual simpliciter.  
What is thus an individual simpliciter? Here again, the notion is not new, and in this 
case it is even more clearly (as compared to the variation stage/occurrence) a purely 
terminological variation adopted only for the sake of exposition. As a matter of fact, we have 
already encountered the notion of an individual (simpliciter; I shall henceforth drop this term) 
in our discussion above. An individual is simply a worm. But it is worth bearing in mind the 
difference between stage and worm theories: the former claims that the objects of predication 
and quantification are stages, whereas the latter ascribes that role to worms. Analogously to 
stage theory, I take an individual to be a cluster of individual occurrences (Sider 1996 talks 
about an aggregate of stages). This cluster is the product of a special equivalence relation over 
individual occurrences, which is known as the I-relation (cf. Lewis 1983, p. 58 ff.). An 
individual is then defined as an equivalence class induced by the I-relation (whatever the 
criteria of application associated with it). We say that two occurrences are I-related when they 
are occurrences of the same individual. 
Proper names have intension, and the intension of a proper name is an individual. The 
concept of an individual is what determines reference to particular occurrences of that 
individual, and the I-relation, i.e., the relation that assures the cohesion of isolated 
occurrences to form an individual, is what makes it possible to refer to the same individual by 
its proper name—a related idea is briefly outlined in Sider (1996).13 Once we have the 
concept of an individual, say, Barack Obama, we become able to refer to occurrences of 
                                                
13 As I have indicated above, most of my reluctance in equating my views with Sider’s (or Hawley’s) stems from 
the fact that we focus on distinct matters. He uses semantic examples to display the workings of his metaphysical 
views, whereas I use those metaphysical views to develop a semantic theory. 
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Barack Obama by using the name ‘Barack Obama’. This answers the question that we asked 
above of what feature of the name ‘Paris’ makes it possible for that name to refer to the city 
of Paris: the name refers to an occurrence of that city by virtue of having that city as its 
intension. 
The notion of sameness is in fact essential to the semantics of proper names, because 
without it the name ‘gets stuck’, it attaches to the first occurrence called by that name (via 
initial baptism), and fails to be transferred to further occurrences. Thus for example, without 
the I-relation, the name ‘Barack’ would have remained to this day ‘imprisoned’ in that little 
boy whom Obama’s parents once called ‘Barack’.  
The intension of a name is an individual, and for any given time t (be it an instant, a 
sequence of instants, an interval, a duration: state you favorite description of time), there is a 
corresponding occurrence of that individual at t. This is a kind of Fregean treatment of proper 
names, and it fulfills Frege’s requirement that intension (i.e., Frege’s Sinn) must be an 
objective notion.  
Furthermore, this picture of an individual qua intension may be presented in the usual 
mathematical way in terms of an intensional (typically partial) function i from times to 
occurrences, which for time t yields an occurrence ot = i(t) of i at t. There is, of course, a 
superficial difference with respect to the canonical treatments (e.g., Carnap’s 1947 notion of 
‘individual concepts’), which takes a possible world instead of a time as the argument of the 
intensional function. This difference, however, is inessential, for we are merely assuming here 
that the possible world is fixed and that intension is indeed dependent on time—if one wishes 
to take possible worlds into account, it suffices to increment the intensional function i with a 
second argument, so that it would produce an occurrence ot,w = i(t,w) of i at time t and world 
w. 
Proper names are normally ascribed to individuals, not to individual occurrences—we 
do name an occurrence, but only because the name is expected to ‘spread out’ over any 
occurrence of the relevant individual. Indeed, there would be not much usefulness in giving 
different names to different occurrences of the same individual, for those names would 
exhibit a kind of indexicality akin to the case of demonstratives. The function of proper 
names, it seems to me, is precisely to enable speakers to refer to an object regardless of any 
change that that object might undergo over time. Simply put, the main function of proper 
names is to track an individual over time. 
 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 
4. Confronting the theories 
 
Occurrence theory deals with Russell’s acquaintance problem in a straightforward way. 
Speakers become acquainted with an individual in much the same way that they become 
acquainted with universals such as the property of being red. Indeed, names are passed from 
speaker to speaker through the famous causal chain of communication in much the same way 
as other predicates and ordinary functions.14 This makes explicit the connection with 
Russell’s strategy, but where Russell attaches a definite description to a name in order to 
make acquaintance with its referent possible, occurrence theory associates a name with a 
specific intensional function.  
The main difference between names on the one hand, and predicates and ordinary 
functions on the other, is that only the former are associated with an operation of 
individuation. This helps explaining how names can have intension, while they seem at the 
same time to lie on the periphery of language: as opposed to ordinary parts of speech whose 
causal chains are continuously ongoing processes that cannot be affected by single speakers,15 
the causal chains associated with names crucially depend on a triggering event (namely initial 
baptism) to be put at work. Metaphorically speaking, the ordinary parts of speech keep 
hovering over the speakers continuously, whereas names demand a propulsion ignition 
system to take off and be put in orbit. 
Occurrence theory contrasts with both descriptivism (including Searle’s late version of 
it) and the causal theory in the following respect. These latter theories would say, each in its 
own way, that the name ‘Barack’ refers to the individual Barack, period. They do not 
distinguish between individuals and individual occurrences—both semantic accounts are 
metaphysically endurantist (despite the fact that Searle 1983 foresaw the importance of a 
more fine-grained metaphysical basis for semantic theories of names). 
                                                
14 This does not mean that occurrence theory is a predicativist theory. Given a time t, predicates refer to a set of 
objects satisfying the predicates at t, whereas names refer to a single object at t. The term ‘cluster-occurrence’ is 
only meant to convey the idea that the intension of a name is a set of time-indexed occurrences. 
15 I am for obvious reasons ignoring the fact that intensions may change over time following the natural 
evolution of languages. The argument operates within a synchronic description of the underlying language. 
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Certain descriptivists might object that the intensional function related to the name N 
may be paraphrased in terms of a specific definite description, namely ‘the individual 
baptized N’, which is a view that authors from both the referentialist and predicativist camps 
have in fact proposed.16 So stated, I do not oppose to that paraphrase (for one thing because it 
is obviously true), with the further qualification that ‘individual’ must be understood 
semantically as a function—unlike the cases of the theories just mentioned—, not as an 
unanalyzed term.  
We could even try a more accurate one: ‘the set of occurrences that are I-related to the 
occurrence baptized N’. One should now, however, be aware of the fact that what is involved 
in this new paraphrase is not a ‘genuine’ definite description, in the sense that the description 
does not refer to a single first-order entity. In our current setup, indeed, the basic entities of 
our domain of quantification are individual occurrences, not sets of individual occurrences. 
As a consequence, it seems that for us to be able to analyze the paraphrase in terms of definite 
descriptions, we should have a means of uniquely identifying each occurrence in ‘the set of 
occurrences that are I-related to the occurrence baptized N’, most plausibly via some 
definite(s) description(s), which would then send us back to a kind of cluster-descriptivism. 
Descriptivism in general falls prey to specific descriptions because it finds no other means to 
identify occurrences, which is a consequence of the fact that metaphysically speaking 
descriptivism is an endurantist theory. In contrast, the cluster-occurrence theory avoids that 
trap by introducing occurrences at the ontological level of the theory, so that it does not have 
to state qualitative features of those entities in order to be able to identify them.  
The anti-descriptivist could also relate the association of the name ‘Jane’ with the set of 
occurrences I-related to the occurrence initially called ‘Jane’ to a well-known criticism to 
metalinguistic theories of names. These theories, so the criticism goes, eventually seem to 
attach no content to names at all, since they circularly spell out that purported content in terms 
of the name itself. It would be as if we explained the predicate ‘red’ by stating that red is the 
color called ‘red’. This does not seem to determine the extension of ‘red’ at any possible 
world, for it amounts to merely saying that ‘red’ is a color, which is indeed insufficient to 
determine which objects are red. Likewise, to explain the name ‘Jane’ as the individual called 
‘Jane’ is to say that ‘Jane’ is the name of an individual, which is insufficient to fix the referent 
of ‘Jane’.  
                                                
16 On the referentialist side, this view is known as metalinguistic descriptivism, and is supported among others 
by Bach (1981) and Geurts (1997). Fara (2015) develops a related (though non-metalinguistic) idea in 
connection with predicativism. 
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Another way of stating the criticism is by imagining again the situation in which I know 
no one by the name of ‘Jane’, and I ask you, “Who’s Jane?” As I pointed out above, by the 
very act of asking this question I am already using the name ‘Jane’ and referring to Jane. 
Indeed, even though I ignore who Jane is, I do attach some conceptual content to that name—
by using ‘who’ rather than ‘what’ I convey for example the facts that I believe that ‘Jane’ is a 
name of an object and not of a color, and that this object is a person (or maybe a pet) and not 
a business corporation. Contrast this with the question, “What’s ‘Jane’?” In this case, I am not 
using the name, but only mentioning it—no reference to Jane is achieved. I am now really 
doing something that I was not before (with the who-question): I am trying to attach some 
conceptual content to the name ‘Jane’ in order to be able to adequately use it. Moreover, the 
reply, “ ‘Jane’ is the name of an individual” is certainly an informative answer (to the what-
question), since it already enables me to use the name to say a few things such as, “I have an 
instinctive feeling that Jane is an honest person,” or to ask the question that I asked before, 
“Who’s Jane?”  
This latter question is not the same as, “What’s the meaning (sense) of ‘Jane’?” Rather, 
it is a request of the kind, “Tell me about Jane.” When you tell me about Jane, for instance 
that Jane is Smith’s murderer, and the perpetrator of the first virtual crime in history, you are 
not thereby trying to convey what the meaning of ‘Jane’ is, but only to say some (true or 
false) facts about Jane. The same function is performed by indefinite descriptions, as when 
you answer my question by saying, “Jane is a friend of mine.” This is the reason why definite 
and indefinite descriptions are equally insufficient as full concepts attached to the name 
‘Jane’.17 
Therefore, it is certainly unfair to say that, “ ‘Jane’ is an individual” is vacuous,18 but it 
is also an overstatement to affirm that the sentence provides the intension associated with 
‘Jane’, for it just says something (not all there is) about Jane. 
According to occurrence theory, however, “ ‘Jane’ refers to the individual called ‘Jane’ 
” (as an answer to the what-question) not only is not vacuous, but it is also rich enough a 
concept to uniquely determine the referent of ‘Jane’. This is so because ‘individual’ is itself a 
                                                
17 Another well-known argument by Kripke against descriptivism uses a similar example (“Feynman is a famous 
physicist”) to show that a name might be associated with an indefinite description, which is not an intension, and 
which is also insufficient for determining reference (cf. Kripke 1980, p. 91). 
18 Another illustration of this: if I tell you that 91P is big, and you ask, “What’s ‘91P’?” you would not consider 
it trivial to hear from me that 91P is a comet. Moreover, you would most often be satisfied with that much of a 
clarification. The illusory triviality related to the case of ‘Jane’ comes from the fact that the name is commonly 
understood by default as a name of humans of the female gender—which is the reason why the what-question is 
immediately shifted to the who-question. 
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complex concept, unlike in metalinguistic theories. In these latter, the individual called ‘Jane’ 
is the object referred to by any utterance of that name. As a consequence, ‘Jane’ and ‘the 
individual called ‘Jane’ ’ are co-referential terms. This co-referentiality seems to explain why 
the formulation, “ ‘Jane’ refers to the individual called ‘Jane’ ” is understood as a variation of 
“ ‘Jane’ is (the name of) an individual,” thus failing to uniquely determine the referent of 
‘Jane’. 
However, this is so only because the notion of individual is taken as unanalyzed by the 
standard metalinguistic theories. In occurrence theory, there is a mediating relation (i.e., the I-
relation) that carries the conceptual idea of an occurrence being related to an original 
occurrence—where by ‘original occurrence’ I mean the occurrence to which the name was 
attached by initial baptism. As a consequence, ‘Jane’ and ‘the individual called ‘Jane’ ’ need 
not refer to the same referent, and as a matter of fact they typically do not. As stated in the 
context of occurrence theory, “ ‘Jane’ refers to the individual called ‘Jane’ ” relates, by the 
conceptual mediation of the I-relation, the referent of any occurrence of ‘Jane’ to the original 
occurrence of ‘Jane’. 
We can now also appreciate the reason why the communication chain put forward by 
causal theorists lacks explanatory power in the context of an externalist approach to the 
semantics of names. As we have seen, we already need the notion of identification at the level 
of baptism.19 This means that at that level, identification as a general operation is already 
settled via I-relation. Once the causal chain is triggered through initial baptism, the I-relation 
takes care of the respective name; and as the term indicates, the I-relation is a relation, not a 
communication chain. At best, the communication chain provides a socio-linguistic 
explanation of how communication is possible in general, of why meaning is collective, and 
so forth. What is more, such kind of explanation is needed anyway regardless of what part of 
the speech is at issue—it is no special explanation specific to the case of names. 
Another feature to notice about the causal theory is that it postulates that names are 
rigid designators, that is, they refer to the same individual in all possible worlds (in which that 
individual exists). In this way, Kripke’s modal argument does not even apply—since names 
refer directly, there is nothing whose modal profile could be compared to the modal profile of 
a proper name. Nevertheless, in occurrence theory names do not refer directly, they refer in 
                                                
19 In this connection, we could paraphrase a dubbing event as follows: “The name N is to refer to any individual 
occurrence that is an occurrence of the same individual as this individual occurrence.” The crucial role of 
sameness in that expression indicates that initial baptism could not be fully carried out in the absence of an 
underlying notion of identification. 
 22 
virtue of having an individual as their intension. Therefore, Kripke’s modal argument must be 
addressed in connection with occurrence theory. 
  What is the modal profile of an individual? Is it the same as that of the name 
associated with it by occurrence theory? It clearly is, because it would seem absurd to affirm 
that a certain occurrence of Nixon could have been an occurrence of an individual other than 
Nixon. This is analogous to Kripke’s observation that “no one other than Nixon might have 
been Nixon” (1980, p. 48). Notice, however, that rigidity is essential to Kripke’s argument. 
Without rigidity, indeed, it would be possible for ‘Nixon’ to refer to an individual other than 
Nixon in some possible world. But once we work in a perdurantist setup, we need no rigidity 
any longer. In fact, in occurrence theory names are not rigid, because they are indirectly 
governed by the I-relation; and the I-relation is a non-logical (equivalence) relation, which 
means that its extension varies across possible worlds.  
In occurrence theory, we can consistently say that no occurrence of Obama (to come 
back to contemporary politics) might be an occurrence of another individual, and that an 
occurrence of Obama might not be an occurrence of Obama. The intuitive sense of the latter 
affirmation is that an actual occurrence of Obama could have satisfied different properties 
from the ones that it actually satisfies. For instance, the actual occurrence of Obama at the 
present time has the property of being president of the United States, but at the present time 
Obama could have been instead the concertmaster of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra. 
Clearly, these two possible occurrences belong to two different possible worlds (one 
actualized, the other non-actualized). This is consistent with the assertion that neither 
occurrence is a possible occurrence of an individual other than Obama—there are (among 
others) two possible present Obamas none of whom might be, say, a possible present Kripke.   
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The weaknesses of descriptivism and the causal theory seem to share a common source, 
which is the fact that both accounts are ontologically based on the metaphysical premises of 
endurantism. In this paper, I aimed at developing a theory of names, which I called ‘the 
cluster-occurrence theory of proper names’, that is on the contrary founded on the perdurantist 
assumption that individuals have temporal parts, thus taking into account the fundamental role 
of change and time in the constitution of the notion of individual. 
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In particular, occurrence theory bears on a type of perdurantist view known as ‘stage 
theory’, whose distinguishing assumption is the following. Individuals have temporal parts, 
and contrary to what worm theory claims, what persists through time is these temporal parts, 
or stages, not the whole individual qua worm. For the sake of neutrality with regard to the 
precise notion of temporal stage, I introduced the notion of individual occurrence. An 
individual simpliciter was then defined as any equivalence class of individual occurrences 
induced by the I-relation, which is the relation between individual occurrences of the same 
individual. 
Back to the semantics of names, we have seen that occurrence theory is the view that 
(1), names refer to individual occurrences; and (2), the intension of a name is an individual. It 
was then shown that the usual formal representation of the notion of intension as a 
mathematical function applies easily to our definition of an individual, provided that we 
introduce an argument for times into the intensional function. In this way, an individual may 
be viewed as a (typically partial) function that for a given time returns an individual 
occurrence (of that individual) at that time. 
Aspects of occurrence theory were then confronted to some of the most important 
features of descriptivism (including cluster-descriptivism and metalinguistic descriptivism) 
and the causal theory, such as the characteristic attribution of qualitative content to names by 
descriptivists, and the externalist nature of the causal chain postulated by causal theorists (as 
well as its conflictive relation to the communication version of that chain). In these respects, 
occurrence theory departs from those theories by postulating a ‘non-qualitative’ intension 
associated with names (in the sense that names refer to individual occurrences without 
picking out any particular qualitative property of those occurrences), in the context of an 
internalist and indirect approach to the issue of how names refer—names refer via their 
intension. 
Other important matters in connection with occurrence theory could not, however, be 
treated in detail or at all within the bounds of this article and must be left for future work, 
among which we can cite Kripke’s semantic and epistemic arguments against descriptivism, 
and Russell’s puzzles about non-existence statements and (in relation to Frege’s Identity 
Puzzle) propositional attitudes. A more in-depth investigation also remains to be carried out 
on the nature of individual occurrences and individuals simpliciter, especially regarding their 
interactions with modality and the debate internalism/externalism. It is my hope, however, 
that the curious readers, equipped with the theoretical basis of occurrence theory provided by 
 24 
our discussion, will already be able to foresee the ways in which the theory should respond to 
the problems raised by such issues.  
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